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THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AMENDMENTS
OF 1986: REFORM OR REHASH?
Richard A. Boswell*
INTRODUCTION
Few doubt that reform of this nation's immigration and refugee
policy requires the immediate attention of the Executive and Legislative
Branches. The scope of the needed reform, however, is subject to strong
disagreement. In a political compromise' that only begins to address
the problems of immigration reform, the 99th Congress passed a series
of immigration bills.
2
The same interests that have dominated congressional debate since
restrictions were first placed on immigration in 18753 controlled the
99th Congress. These include the voices of those wishing to restrict
immigration 4 and those seeking to preserve existing immigration law.'
The agricultural interest groups also forcefully argued their position. 6
Noticeably ineffective were those seeking to correct a host of unad-
dressed issues in U.S. immigration law.
7
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A., Loyola-Marymount University,
1975; J.D., George Washington University, National Law Center, 1979. I am indebted to Nancy
Hochman for her helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., House Rejects Consideration of Immigration Reform Bill, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES
832, 833 (1986).
2. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (the
most widely publicized of the immigration bills); Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537; and Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 [hereinafter collectively cited as 1986 Amendments].
3. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
4. Restrictionists were reform proponents, who argued that U.S. borders were like a sieve. See
Zolberg, Contemporary Transnational Migrations in Historical Perspective: Patterns and
Dilemmas, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES 15, 45
(M. Kritz ed. 1983).
5. Opponents of the restrictionists could be called "preservationists," as they did not propose
that immigration be increased. Preservationists never controlled the debate and were relegated
to arguing that immigration reform should preserve the traditional humanitarian and family
reunification policies.
6. Directly and adversely affected by proposals to restrict immigration, the agricultural interest
group was not interested in reform. Rather, it argued that if immigration reform was needed,
it must consider employers' legitimate demands for inexpensive farm labor. The agricultural
industry argued that farmers must be able to bring in harvest workers, lest crops rot in the
fields. Congress had to accommodate this need or cause the cost of food products to increase
dramatically.
7. The immigration laws have been criticized as being racist, antiquated, illogical and generally
unfair. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIn. RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS
ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 7-19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT];
Gordon, The Need to Modernize our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1975);
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The 99th Congress' inability to seriously address certain issues
central to immigration reform should not be surprising, for the issues
do not lend themselves to easy solutions. It also is of little surprise
that there were few proponents of broader reform,8 as U.S. immigration
policies have become more restrictive since the the 1870s. 9 The greatest
danger of the 1986 Amendments, however, is that their passage will
convince Congress that it has adequately addressed the important is-
sues. '0
This piece will attempt to put the recent immigration legislation in
perspective in three ways. First, it will briefly review the history of
immigration reform since the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. Second,
it will describe the changes in immigration law resulting from the 1986
Amendments. Finally, it will propose reform regarding some of the
important issues not addressed by the 99th Congress.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The United States would like to be viewed as a nation that welcomes
'[the] tired . . . poor .. . [and] huddled masses . . . ."" Yet its
immigration laws have constantly imposed further restrictions on the
admission of foreigners. 2 Rarely have immigration enactments intended
Hing, Racial Disparity: The Unaddressed Issue of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, 1 LA RAzA L.J.
21 (1983); Orlow, Foreword: Immigration and Nationality Symposium, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (1983); Orlow, America's Incoherent Immigration Policy: Some Problems and
Solutions, 36 U. MIASm L. REv. 931 (1982) [hereinafter cited as America's Policy]; Wasserman,
The Undemocratic, Illogical and Arbitrary Immigration Laws of the United States, 3 INT'L
LAW. 254 (1969); Watson, The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill: An Analysis of Selected Economic
Policies, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 97 (1982).
8. Americans' perception that their nation is out of control of its borders also stymies debate
conducive to a more open immigration policy. Moreover, the historical trend has been toward
greater restrictions, rather than a liberalization. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying
text.
9. An act passed in 1875 barred the admission of convicts and prostitutes. Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
ch. 141, 18 Stat. In 1882, when the first general immigration laws were enacted, blatantly
racist exclusion provisions banned the admission of Chinese persons. See The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 58. The Chinese Exclusion
Act remained in force until 1943. See Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. Through
legislation and executive agreements, the racial exclusion grounds were expanded to include
persons from the entire Asia-Pacific Triangle. See Act of Apr. 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat.
176; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
10. The version of the bill approved by the House of Representatives, H.R. 5665, was titled
"The Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments of 1986." See H.R. 5665, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). At first glance, one might conclude that the package of employer
sanctions, a guest worker program and amnesty are signs that reform has arrived. Although
they did not affect as many people, amnesty and guest worker programs have been used
previously. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 3.
11. E. Lazarus, "The New Colossus" (1883) (verse inscribed on the Statue of Liberty).
12. For discussion of forces affecting attitudes on immigration policy, see Schuck, The Trans-
formation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1-3, 85 (1984); Whelan, Principles of
U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 447 (1983). For discussion of the historical
development of U.S. immigration law and policy, see Higham, American Immigration Policy
in Historical Perspective, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 213 (1956); see also C. GORDON &
H. ROSENFIMLD, IMmsmGaTioN LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.2-1.4h (rev. ed 1987).
Immigration Reform Deficiencies
to allow more aliens to come within our borders. This policy may be
paradoxical because immigration laws represent both what the nation
views itself as becoming and what it fears most. 3
The reform movement culminating in the 1986 Amendments began
soon after the enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.14 Im-
mediately after Congress overrode his veto of the Act, President Truman
established the Perlman Commission on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, which made extensive recommendations for reform.' 5
Efforts at comprehensive reform were unsuccessful and limited to
the passage of separate amendments from 1953 to 1980.16 Interestingly,
the reform proposals discussed by contemporary reformers and com-
mentators bear a striking resemblance to proposals made immediately
after passage of the McCarran-Walter Act. 17 In 1978, President Carter
created the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy,
which issued its final report in 1981.1Is
Before the creation of the Select Commission, scholars and prac-
titioners criticized virtually every major provision of the McCarran-
Walter Act.19 Nevertheless, Congress could not reach a consensus on
13. At least one scholar has argued that immigration reform is elusive in part because it tugs at
the emotional fabric of the nation. See Fuchs, Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44
U. Prrr. L. REv. 433, 433 (1983). See also Schuck, supra note 12, at 47-55.
14. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952).
15. See Exec. Order No. 10,392, 17 Fed. Reg. 8,061 (1952). See also H.R. Doc. 520, 82nd
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 921-27
(President Truman's veto message to Congress).
16. See Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400; Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub.
L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639; Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 650; Act
of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911; Act of Apr. 7, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
225, 84 Stat. 116; Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
571, 90 Stat. 2703; Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
17. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON IMMIRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME (1953), reprinted in 6 0. TRELLES & J. BAILEY, IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY ACTS LEGISLATIvE HIsToRtEs AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, at Doc. 11 (1979)
(some of the more important recommendations of the Perlman Commission covered such
issues as the review of consular decisions, the establishment of a statute of limitations for
grounds of deportation and modification of the annual quota based on the 1920 census).
The American Bar Association also made proposals similar to those of the Perlman
Commission. See 10 ADMN. L. BuLL. 10-11 (1957); see also Rosenfield, The Prospect for
Immigration Amendments, 21 LAW & CONTEME. PROB. 401 (1956).
18. The Select Commission was established to "study and evaluate ... existing laws, policies,
and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the United States
and to make such administrative and Iggislative recommendations to the President and to
the Congress as are appropriate." Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907, 908 (1978).
The Commission's study was exhaustive and recommended comprehensive revisions to
the Immigration and Nationality Act. For example, the Commission called for sweeping
changes including international efforts, employer sanctions, changes in the immigrant pref-
erence system and judicial review. See SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Final Report at XV-XXXII (1981),
reprinted in Joint Comm. Doc. No. 8, HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY AND SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1981).
19. See generally Chiswick, Guidelines for the Reform of Immigration Policy, 36 U. MAM, L.
REv. 893 (1982); Fragomen & Del Rey, The Immigration Selection System: A Proposal for
19871
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the proper course of action to be taken. 20 Passage of the 1986 Amend-
ments may be more a tribute to the tenacity and legislative genius of
the drafters than an expression of national consensus on the issue.2 1
THE 1986 REFORM EFFORT
Congress' labeling legislation as "reform" does not make it so.
The 1986 Amendments were not as far-reaching as any predecessor
amendments before Congress. 2 The McCarran-Walter Act remains the
core of U.S. immigration policy, and the 1986 Amendments merely
continue McCarran-Walter Act policies. 23
Nevertheless, the 1986 Amendments changed immigration law in
two important ways. First, they created a new "tier" of alien status in
Reform, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1979); Gordon, supra note 7; Kurzban, A Critical Analysis
of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAM L. REv. 5 (1982); Maslow, Recasting our Deportation Laws:
Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1956); America's Policy, supra note 7;
Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DmO L. REV. 1
(1980); Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 27 FoRDHAm L. REV. 145 (1958).
20. The difficulty Congress experienced in the period between the issuance of the Commission's
final report and the passage of the 1986 Amendments has been common to immigration
legislation. For example, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which remains the core of U.S.
immigration law, was very controversial and was passed over the veto of President Truman.
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Similarly, the 1917 Act was passed over
President Wilson's veto. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENItED, supra note 12, at § 1.2c.
21. The 1986 Amendments are what is left of bills presented in the 97th, 98th and 99th Congresses
and preceding years. The Amendments have an extensive history of revisions, beginning in
1981. They have been called the Immigration Reform and Control Act; the Simpson-Mazzoli
bill; the Simpson-Rodino bill; and the Simpson-Rodino-Mazzoli bill. For discussion of the
history of the 1986 Amendments, see H. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-55 (1986).
Only astute maneuvering and political alliances made the eventual passage of the legislation
possible. See Leiden, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Introduction and
Legislative Overview, IMMGR. J., Oct.-Dec. 1986, at 1, 10.
22. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S.
KLEINMAN, SPECIAL UPDATE: 1986 IMMIGRATIO N AND NATIONALITY ACTS 4 (1987); Schuck,
supra note 12, at 46.
23. The nation's immigration laws still distinguish between temporary and permanent migrants.
The distinction centers on the length of the aliens' intended stay. The statute presumes that
all aliens intend to stay on a permanent basis. It requires them to obtain certification that
they will either not enter the labor market or that their employment will not displace or
adversely effect the wages and working conditions of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982). Alternatively, aliens may show they have the
requisite family ties with a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. In addition, they must not
fit into any of the categories of "excludable" aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982). For example,
immigrants must show they can support themselves and that they do not have criminal
records. Most importantly, they must show that the immigrant quota in the category upon
which their admission is based has not been exhausted for that year.
If aliens wish to stay for a short time, they must also show admissibility under the pre-
established "nonimmigrant" categories. 8 U.S.C. § 1 I01(a)(15)(A)-(M) (1982). Temporary
migrants, or nonimmigrants, are not restricted by the annual quota and may not engage in
employment unless it is of a temporary nature and restricted to certain nonimmigrant
categories. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(H), (L) (1982); 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h), (1) (1987).
The 1986 Amendments also allow immigration for the same categories permitted to immigrate
by the 1952 Act. These include family relationships, needed foreign laborers and those
admitted for humanitarian reasons.
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their treatment of amnestied persons-agricultural workers and certain
aliens seeking residency via marriage to U.S. citizens. Second, the
Amendments increased the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
search and seizure power, a change that will affect all U.S. workers
and employers.
Two-Tiered Residency
Traditionally, the treatment aliens arriving in the United States
received depended on how long they intended to stay. Employment of
aliens coming for a short time (nonimmigrants) is severely limited, while
those coming permanently (immigrants) enjoy constitutional protections
when returning to the United States. 24 Legislation and judicial opinions,
however, have whittled away the rights of lawful permanent residents.
Aliens' rights increasingly are conditioned upon their becoming part of
the national community with a concomitant disgorgement of foreign
allegiances .25
The 1986 Amendments continue the trend toward limiting aliens'
rights in two important ways. First, it will be more difficult for aliens
to stay in the United States as "permanent residents" without becoming
citizens. Second, certain aliens who under prior law would have been
classified as immigrants will only be granted a nonimmigrant or con-
ditional status. This change is reflected in provisions allowing for large-
scale admission of "temporary" agricultural workers and in the con-
ditional status placed on aliens eligible for amnesty26 or those who are
seeking immigration benefits based upon marriage to U.S. citizens or
lawful permanent residents. 2
7
24. See 8 C.F.R. § 109.1 (1987); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). Generally, aliens
may be accorded either nonimmigrant or immigrant status. Nonimmigrant status may be
granted only to those meeting the statute's requirements and showing that they have a
residence abroad to which they will return after their temporary stay in the United States. 8
U.S.C. § 1 I01(a)(15)(A)-(M) (1982). Immigrant status can only be accorded to persons who
establish the requisite family ties or a specific need for their work skills in the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1982).
25. See Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and Community Ties: A Response to Martin, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 237 (1983); Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PiTT. L. REv. 165, 173-80 (1983). It has been argued
that the United States should adopt a "consensual" law of citizenship that limits the
acquisition of U.S. citizenship by children of non-U.S. citizens or permanent residents. See
P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIzENSHIt WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN
POLITY 116-19 (1985).
26. The amnesty, or legalization, is designed to initially place aliens in a temporary resident
status. In order to qualify, they must have resided continuously and unlawfully in the United
States since before Jan. 1, 1982.
27. The Marriage Fraud Amendments provide severe penalties against aliens who marry U.S.
citizens or permanent residents for the sole purpose of obtaining immigration benefits. See
Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986). The provisions impose a two-year conditional
residency status on all aliens seeking residency based upon their marriage to a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident. Those who marry a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident
while in deportation or exclusion proceedings are precluded from obtaining permanent
19871
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Search and Seizure Power
Insulated from judicial review and the normal scrutiny placed on
governmental action, immigration law has maintained a unique position
in our legal system. The judiciary's deference to immigration control
as a regulatory, rather than penal, power 28 and acceptance of the notion
that immigration control is an inherent foreign policy power of the
federal government have granted immigration law its unique status.
The 1986 Amendments will, for the first time, bring the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service's enforcement power squarely within
the country's borders. 29 Although employers do not bear the full re-
sponsibility of enforcing the law or even of reporting violators to the
INS, they will become the law's indirect enforcers.30 For the first time,
employers are subject to penalties for immigration law violations. All
citizens, whether employers or employees, will come legally within the
easy reach of INS record searches.1
2
residence based upon that marriage until they have resided outside of the United States for
two years after the marriage. See Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (adding
8 U.S.C. § 1186). See also Congress Passes Marriage Fraud and Consular Efficiency Bills,
63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 904, 907 (1986); More Details on New Marriage Fraud and Consular
Efficiency Laws, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 963, 964 (1986).
28. The Supreme Court, for example, has reasoned that deportation is a civil, not criminal,
sanction. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). It is because of this civil character
that certain governmental actions are permissible. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (finding the prohibition against ex post facto laws
inapplicable to immigration questions).
Although Justice Brandeis asserted that deportation was perhaps one of the worst forms
of punishment for an individual to experience, constitutional arguments in favor of criminal
protections for aliens in deportation proceedings have yet to succeed. Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922).
29. The control of immigration has not been a major concern for most U.S. citizens, except
when they have felt directly affected by the influx of foreigners. This lack of concern for
immigration laws is attributable, in part, to the fact that immigration laws do not apply to
U.S. citizens. See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 4.5a. Americans have
become more aware of the growing immigration crisis recently. This awareness may be
caused, in part, by mass influxes of aliens, because of political and economic upheaval
abroad and drug smuggling across the border. See Leiden, supra note 21, at 9. Some
commentators highlight the Carter Administration's inability to account for thousands of
Iranian students in the United States after the Iranian "hostage crisis" as contributing to
growing awareness of the need for reform. See id. at 1.
30. This policy of shifting the responsibility of enforcing immigration laws is increasing. For
example, the INS has promulgated regulations that will place more responsibility upon
educational institutions for the enforcement of regulations governing foreign students. See
52 Fed. Reg. 13, 223 (1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2. Similar approaches have
been taken in operating detention centers and in implementing the legalization program.
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS 4-7 (1985); 52 Fed. Reg. 16,192
(1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(c)(2) and (3)).
31. The bill makes it unlawful for any employer, irrespective of the number of persons in his
employ, to hire or recruit for a fee aliens who do not have permission to work. Pub. L.
No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(a) (1982)). Employers
who violate this provision may be subject to fines from $250 to $10,000 or imprisonment
up to six months, depending on the violation. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324A(e) and (f)).
32. INS officers are authorized under the statute to review employers' records. See Pub. L. No.
99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (adding 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(3)). Unless employers can
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In order to assure that employer sanctions are effective and nondis-
criminatory, the INS, in cooperation with other agencies, has been
charged with developing a verifiable identification system.33 The system
will enable employers to ascertain whether a person has permission to
work. Uncertainty remains about what form this verification system
will take.
34
Through employer sanctions and a national identification system,
all U.S. citizens, either as employers or job seekers, will be required to
prove that their employment relationship is federally permissible. To
protect against the discrimination that may be caused by an employer's
fear of sanctions,35 the statute makes discrimination on the grounds of
national origin an "unfair immigration related employment practice,"
and discrimination complaints may be lodged against violating employ-
ers.36 Although INS activities hardly have affected domestic constituen-
cies, the employer-sanction and discrimination provisions bring the
establish that they have reviewed a potential employee's documentation, there will be a
presumption that the alien employee did not have permission to work. Employers must
review the applicant's passport, certificate of citizenship or naturalization or alien registration
receipt card (green card).
The circumstances that, ineffect, shift the burden of proof to the INS are:
1. The employee was referred to the employer by a state employment agency.
2. The alien presented a driver's license or similar document with a photograph issued
by a state for identification accompanied by the alien's social security card (if it does not
contain an endorsement that it is not valid for employment purposes) or a birth certificate
(or, in the case of persons under the age of 16, other documentation allowed by the Attorney
General).
The employer must also have the employee or prospective employee attest, on a special
form designated by the Attorney General, to the authenticity of documents used to establish
identification. This attestation form must be kept by the employer and must be available for
inspection by officers of the Department of Labor or the INS for three years after the date
of hire or one year after termination of employment, whichever is later. Pub. L. No. 99-
603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(3) (1982)). Employers' failure
to keep the attestation forms may subject them to fines of up to $1,000. Pub. L. No. 99-
603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324(e)(5) (1982)).
33. In the past, the INS has had difficulty gaining access to employers' records. In some INS
districts, officers were able, through a program known as "Operation Cooperation," to gain
access to employers' records to determine who was and was not authorized to work. Under
this program, employers believed it was better to allow an "informal" search of the records
than to have a sweep of the workplace during the work day. This statutory provision, in
effect, allows for warrantless searches, as it is clearly within the INS authority to review
such records. See Kleinman, supra note 22, at 5.
34. It is not clear whether the identification system will provide cause for the INS officer who
suspects that an alien is undocumented to request production of a valid document. Such
questioning, if permissible, would justify inquiry until it is established that the interrogee is
a U.S. citizen.
35. Opponents of the employer-sanctions provisions are concerned that employers' fear of
sanctions for hiring undocumented workers may cause an inclination toward discrimination
against certain job applicants because they are "foreign-looking." See Anti-Discrimination
Provisions of H.R. 3080, Joint Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees and International Law and the Senate Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1986) (testimony of Rep. Garcia); Pub. L. No. 99-603, §
102a, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (adding 8 U.S.C. § 1324B(a)(l)).
36. This provision was inserted to allay concerns that employer sanctions would cause "national
origin" discrimination against certain minority groups. What constitutes an "unfair immi-
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agency into direct contact with U.S. citizens. The courts likely will
place greater scrutiny on INS actions in the future when U.S. citizens
are the complainants.
NEW PRESSURE AREAS
Economic and political upheaval abroad create a supply of people
seeking to migrate.37 U.S. employers' needs for skilled and unskilled
workers provide demand for immigrants. 38 These forces are analagous
to a macroeconomic supply and demand curve. Immigration policy
affects the supply of and demand for immigrants. Three policy methods
used to control immigration supply and demand are quota systems,
amnesty programs and agricultural worker provisions.
The Quota Problem
An inflexible, oversubscribed annual quota prohibits the admission
of most potential immigrants. 9 The demand for immigrant visas by
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents for the admission of their
family members far exceeds availability. Many otherwise qualified aliens
have to wait two to seven years for immigrant visas. 4"
The 1986 Amendments increase the pressures on the immigration
gration-related employment practice" is not clear, for an employer may arguably discriminate
against an individual based on national origin when the alien is a permanent resident or
nonimmigrant. Although it prohibits national-origin-based discrimination, the statute does
not prevent an employer from hiring an "equally qualified" U.S. citizen over an alien. Pub.
L. No. 99-603, § 102a, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324B(a)(4)). Allegations
of discrimination will be investigated by a special counsel created under the statute. In the
event that action is not brought by the special counsel within 120 days of the filing of a
complaint, an individual may bring a private action to enforce the statute.
37. "Push" factors are those internal forces that cause persons to leave their homes and migrate.
For discussion of push-pull factors, see Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search
of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 623-29 (1981); see also
generally J. Card, Push and Pull Factors at Origin and Destination as Determinants of
Migration (1980) (study prepared for the Select Comm'n on Immigration and Refugee Policy).
38. Pressures in the immigrant-receiving nations that attract migrants are commonly referred to
as "pull" factors. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-12; Hing, supra note 7, at
22-31.
40. The present quota system, for example, delays the immigration of spouses or children of
lawful permanent residents between one and five years, depending on the country of origin.
If the quota is exhausted in the applicant's preference category, he or she is put on a waiting
list until there is a visa available. The system delays the immigration of siblings more than
seven years. The delays are greater for persons from countries such as India, Korea, Mexico
and the Philippines or colonies such as Hong Kong. See generally Note, The Immigration
System: Need to Eliminate Discrimination and Delay, 8 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 191 (1975).
The original Simpson-Mazzoli bill would have increased the total number of immigrants
entering the United States each year. The bill provided for an annual cap of 425,000
immigrants but limited the family reunification quota preferences. See S. 2222, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. §§ 201-13 (1982). Although this was an increase from the annual immigrant quota
of 270,000, legal migration outside of the quota system brought the total number of
immigrants in 1986 to 500,109. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS,
WORLDWIDE VISA SERVICES DURING 1986, at I (Vol. 100, No. 5), reprinted in 64 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 234-35 (1987); see also Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical
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system. Pressures on the border will be felt when those seeking admis-
sion find it more difficult to enter.4' In addition, demands for family-
reunification immigration will increase when aliens amnestied under the
1986 Amendments begin petitioning for family members, all of whom
will add to the quota backlog. These pressures will be exacerbated when
combined with U.S. employers' unquenched demand for skilled and
unskilled workers.
42
Elimination of the fixed quota would require cooperation between
the Executive and Legislative Branches. A flexible admissions system
could draw a balance between family reunification and the purely
economic interest in skilled and unskilled labor. 43 The only proposals
to modify the quota system have attacked individual preference cate-
gories. 44
Migration limitations based upon skilled or unskilled labor have
been criticized as contradictory and illogical in methodology. 45 Employ-
ers unable to find U.S. workers are forced to hire aliens, must advertise
for the already filled positions and then wait up to two years before
the aliens can work in legal status." The 1986 Amendments do not
attack these problems; instead, they allow a limited group of employers
(farmers) to bring in workers and limit their rights to those of casual
visitors.
Agricultural Worker Provisions
The 1986 Amendments' provisions for agricultural workers may be
the one area in which the need for workers is eased for a period of
Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. R~v. 819, 827 (1982). The net increase in legal migration would
not have been substantial because the bill would have placed immediate relatives otherwise
outside of the quota within the quota. See Fuchs, supra note 13, at 444.
41. The reform legislation provides for greater controls at the border. This combined with the
added domestic enforcement through employer sanctions makes it more difficult for aliens
to enter and more likely that undocumented aliens will be found. See supra notes 28-37 and
accompanying text.
42. Even when an employer can establish that there are no qualified, willing and available U.S.
workers, the alien employee may not be able to obtain lawful permanent residence for up
to two years. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
43. A flexible system could be established in which the Executive Branch, after consultation with
Congress, could set the legal immigration level for any given period of time. Alien admissions
could be based upon the needs for family reunification and employment and could be
adjusted periodically. Alternatively, the annual admission of immigrants could be set by a
formula that takes into account humanitarian, economic and political factors. Such a system
need not include refugee admissions, because these numbers are set separately. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157.
44. Although the 1986 Amendments do not change the quota system, an earlier Senate version
would have eliminated the immigration of brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens and the
unmarried children older than of lawful permanent residents. See S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 202 (1982).
45. For discussion of reform in the labor certification process, see Rubin & Mancini, An
Overview of the Labor Certification Requirement for Intending Immigrants, 14 SAN DINGO
L. Rav. 76, 77-80 (1976); see also generally Wildes, The Department of Labor: Toward a
Sound Approach to Labor Certification, 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 357 (1980).
46. See generally Wildes, supra note 45.
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time. The agricultural worker provisions47 allowing for increased legal
migration of alien farm workers were the linchpin of the 1986 Amend-
ments' passage. Yet the legislative solution was neither new nor inno-
vative. 4 The program is designed to assure that farmers have enough
workers to harvest their crops, and, notwithstanding the employer
sanctions, 49 that their businesses will not be disrupted. The legal migra-
tion of agricultural workers is intertwined with the amnesty provisions
of the reform legislation.50
Given the popular perception that foreign workers displace U.S.
workers, Congress was not inclined to increase the immigrant quota.
Rather, it formulated a temporary solution,5 which is a modification
of the "Bracero Program," a controversial policy that began in the
World War II era. 2 The Bracero Program caused great hardships to
foreign workers who were admitted, and it may be a source of problems
along the border today. The problems are far-reaching in creating a
subclass of aliens whose status is conditioned on the good graces of an
employer or other person. For example, aliens are less likely to complain
about substandard wages or working conditions when they know loss
47. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 301-5, 100 Stat.
3359, 3411-34 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1l01(a)(15)(H), 1180 and 1186) (these provisions are
often referred to as the "guest worker" statutes).
48. Temporary worker provisions are not new to immigration law. The nonimmigrant "H-2"
visas provide for the admission of aliens when U.S. workers are unavailable to perform
temporary work. 8 U.S.C. § Il01(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982). For discussion of earlier provisions
allowing the influx of large numbers of agricultural workers, see Crvm RIGHTS COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-12.
49. The employer-sanction provisions apply to agricultural employers beginning in December
1988. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. §
1324(i)(3) (1982)).
50. Amnesty is the grant of conditional resident status to persons who can show they worked
on farms during a 90-day period between May 1, 1985, and May 1, 1986. See Pub. L. No.
99-603, § 302, 100 Stat. 3359, 3417 (1986) (adding 8 U.S.C. § 1180 (1982)); see also infra
notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
51. This solution is referred to as the Special Agricultural Worker Program or "SAW" provisions.
See Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 302-03, 100 Stat. 3359, 3417-31 (1986) (adding 8 U.S.C. §§
1160, 1160A (1982)). The SAW Program fully sunsets in 1993, because Congress hopes that
the demand for agricultural workers will have been met through legalization and temporary
admission. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 303, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (adding 8 U.S.C. §
1160(a)(l)); see also 132 Cong. Rec. S16888 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Simpson).
Although one solution might be to treat agricultural workers the same as other workers
coming for extended periods of time, the immigrant quota system makes it impossible to
meet the tremendous demands for foreign labor. Absent a change in the present statute,
treating agricultural workers like other workers would render many of them ineligible because
of quota restrictions. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. The solution, for now,
was to create an exception to the rule that those coming to work for long periods of time
be subjected to a quota and labor certification.
52. The "Bracero Program" initially came about because of the shortage of agricultural workers.
Through this program, the United States allowed needed farm workers into the country.
Later, the informal policy was given sanction by an agreement with Mexico signed in 1951.
For further discussion of the program, see Note, The Mexican Farm Labor Program, 30
GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 84 (1961); Hadley, A Critical Analysis of the Wetback Problem, 21
LAW & CONTE I. PROBS. 334 (1956); Crva RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-12.
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of employment would render them deportable for failure to maintain
their status as temporary workers."
The significant change created by the 1986 Amendments is the
replacement of the clause "to perform temporary services or labor"
with "to perform agricultural labor or services." This change allows
favorable treatment of aliens based not on their intention of staying in
the United States, but on the work performed. Although U.S. employers
need aliens' services, the aliens are not entitled to the protections
afforded other permanent residents. 54 This leaves agricultural workers
subject to the vagaries of their employers and contravenes the original
policies behind the labor certification provisions for the permanent
admission of aliens, which are to protect U.S. workers. Under the 1986
Amendments, "temporary" agricultural workers could come to the
United States for years without receiving the protections of lawful
permanent residency. 5 Continuing an agricultural worker program that
only grants a temporary or conditional status is not "reform." A
nonimmigrant agricultural worker program stretches the definition of
"temporary" in the nonimmigrant visa provisions by ignoring the true
nature of their stay.
Amnesty
The granting of amnesty56 is a response to the nation's inability to
control the border. It also reflects the knowledge that even if the INS
could catch the nation's millions of undocumented aliens, it could not
deport them.5 7 Deportation was frustrated by a judicial process that
53. Immigration laws require that all nonimmigrants properly maintain their status in order to
legally stay in the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1982); Phillipides v. Day, 283 U.S.
48 (1931). See also IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 4.9 (1986);
Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1981); Ghorbani v. INS, 686 F.2d 784 (9th Cir.
1982). ,
There are separate rules for the Special Agricultural Worker alien seeking lawful
permanent resident status. See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 302, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (adding 8
U.S.C. § 1180(a)).
54. Similarly situated non-agricultural workers will be able to receive lawful permanent residence.
As lawful permanent residents, aliens may work where they please, may petition for family
members and eventually obtain U.S. citizenship.
55. Admissions of agricultural workers as nonimmigrants renders them deportable upon loss of
employment because they are not entitled to remain in the United States when not employed
and may not work outside of farms. Legalized workers (granted either temporary or
permanent residence) may move about and work wherever work can be found. One remedy
would be to treat agricultural workers the same as all other workers: Upon proof that their
employment will not take jobs from U.S. workers, they could be eligible for permanent
residence and, thereby, not subject to potential employer abuses.
56. The terms "amnesty" and "legalization" are intended to be synonymous. See Pub. L. No.
99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-404 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)).
57. Many undocumented aliens could apply for suspension of deportation and other forms of
relief from deportation. Given the large numbers of undocumented aliens, it is inconceivable
that the INS could handle such claims. Although nobody seems to be sure how many persons
might be covered under the amnesty provisions, the legalization effort will be monumental.
Only rough approximations can be made of the number of undocumented aliens in the
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made it impossible to expeditiously resolve pending cases." In addition
to easing the burden on the enforcement arm of the INS, amnesty also
brings forward an underground population of undocumented aliens. 9
This amnesty program differs from previous programs that ac-
corded the beneficiaries full status as lawful permanent residents. The
conditional status afforded these aliens prohibits them from petitioning
for immediate family. They must also satisfy prerequisites, which, in
the past, only applied to aliens seeking naturalization ° Similar provi-
sions grant conditional status to aliens seeking permanent residence
based upon marriage to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. 6'
THE FUTURE
In no other area of law is Congress' power as extensive as in
controlling immigration. 62 Its power includes the ability to define classes
United States. One estimate places the number between 3.6 million and 4.8 million. See
Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 3080 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 47 (1985) (statement of Mr. Nelson, Commissioner of the INS).
Another estimate places the number between 2 million and 6 million. See NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCE, IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: A STORY OF NEGLECT 87-88 (1985). Yet another estimates
there were 2 million to 4 million undocumented aliens in the United States at the time of
the 1980 census. See Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearings on H.R.
3080 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and International Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 202, 225 (1985) (statement of J. Passel, Bureau of the
Census); see also Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United
States, 1970-81, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223 (1982).
58. Much has been said about the overloading of the INS system. Athough it is difficult to
pinpoint the source of the problem, it may be attributable to a combination of factors. The
INS has faced a significantly increased workload, because of the number of aliens arriving
at the border and the number of aliens within the country seeking benefits. The massive
influx of Indochinese refugees during the 1970s and other mass migrations have caused
substantial increases in the number of aliens arriving here. Subsequent to arrival, aliens
petition for family and seek permanent residency and citizenship for themselves. The time
period from arrival to citizenship can take up to seven years and requires three separate INS
adjudications. In addition, the number of nonimmigrants arriving in the United States has
increased significantly. Meanwhile, the INS has not significantly modified its method of
adjudication. See generally Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudica-
tion: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1297 (1986); Verkuil, A Study
of Immigration Procedures, UCLA L. REv. 1141 (1984).
59. Congress has granted forms of amnesty in the past. The 1952 Act provided an alternative
to deportation known as suspension of deportation. It allowed aliens to show that their
deportation would cause extreme hardship to them or to their children or spouses who were
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. In such cases, deportation will be suspended,
and they will receive lawful permanent residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982).
60. Traditionally, permanent residents have not been required to seek U.S. citizenship. 3 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 14.1.
61. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(a), 100
Stat. 3537 (1986).
62. It has been long accepted that the authority to determine which aliens are welcome in the
United States rests with Congress.
Although Congress has the power of exclusion, the Executive has the responsibility of
enforcing Congress' will. The immigration power derives from both the Constitution and
inherent powers all nations have. See generally The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
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of deportable aliens, as well as the ability to limit the rights of those
seeking admission. 63 This plenary power over immigration enables Con-
gress to enact blatantly racist statutes. 64 The types of governmental
action tolerated in enforcement of the immigration laws has "known
few bounds. ' 65 Given the judiciary's reluctance to review executive and
legislative action involving immigration, it becomes particularly impor-
tant for these branches to exercise considerable self-restraint when
enacting immigration reform.
The country must reach a consensus regarding several immigration
reform issues. We must first define U.S. interests and then balance
these interests against how we wish the world to view us. Furthermore,
we need a clearer understanding of the forces driving migration.
The political and procedural maneuvering used to enact the 1986
Amendments evidences a lack of direction in immigration policy. These
shortcomings do not, however, reflect a failure of national will. Rather,
they reflect the need for further public deliberation.
Any examination of the 1986 Amendments requires an initial
inquiry into whether, given the enormous pressures placed on the
immigration system, the new law can be implemented. 66 This country's
(1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD,
supra note 12, at 2-19.
Congress does not exercise exclusive control over immigration policy. The Executive may
also act pursuant to its foreign affairs powers. See Narenji v. Civilleti, 617 F.2d 745, 747
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (the Court of Appeals found certain
powers as flowing from the Executive's responsibility over foreign policy); Yassini v. Crosland,
618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); but see Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 216-26 (2d
Cir. 1980). See also I C. GORDON & 4. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at § 2b; Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
63. The extent of this power passed constitutional scrutiny when Congress prohibited the
admission of Asians. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 12, at §
2.2.
Many scholars, however, have criticized the assumption that the congressional power is
plenary. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1392-95 (1953); Gordon, The Alien and
the Constitution, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1972); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing",
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1295-97 (1975) (Judge Friendly suggests earlier cases that had
upheld the exclusion power as being plenary may have been decided differently had they
been decided later); see also Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion-The Rights of Cuban Refugees
Facing Indefinite Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925, 942-47,
953 (1984); Martin, supra note 25, at 173-80; Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens
Under International Law, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 804, 823-29 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 58. Although the policy exhibited
U.S. immigration policy at its worst, it also must be recognized as a demonstration of
humanitarian compassion.
65. United States citizens traditionally have counted on the courts to protect individual rights.
Aliens, however, must rely on small constituencies within the American political structure
that protect foreigners' rights. Once laws are passed, aliens are subject to the beneficence
and discretion of the government agencies entrusted to enforce the immigration laws. See
Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1465-66 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d
957 (lth Cir. 1984).
66. The 1986 Amendments place new adjudicatory and investigative responsibilities on the INS
and other governmental agencies. These new responsibilities include determining eligibility
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growing demand for skilled and unskilled labor, 67 combined with ex-
ternal political and economic factors, creates the additional pressure of
increased migration. In light of U.S. employers' needs to tap into the
undocumented worker pool, the potentially extensive intrusion by the
INS and Department of Labor authorized by the 1986 Amendments
will increase domestic pressures on the INS. Small businesses, tradi-
tionally exempt from federal employment statutes, will find it particu-
larly difficult to comply. These pressures at the border and within the
country have the potential of unraveling the 1986 Amendments' legis-
lative success.
In the past, immigration law and policy has received little public
scrutiny. The 1986 Amendments add a new dimension to immigration
law by bringing it into the fabric of domestic policy. The INS, which
for the amnesty and temporary worker programs and violations of the employer anti-
discrimination provisions. The expansion of the power to conduct searches on business
premises and enforcement of employer sanctions also will place additional burdens on the
bureaucracy. The pressures will further increase as the INS attempts to deport the newly
discovered undocumented aliens found ineligible for amnesty.
The INS always has been behind in adjudicating applications. One example of the
adverse effect of the backlogs in the adjudicatory process can be seen in asylum applications.
Faced with an overwhelming backlog, INS officers cannot spend the necessary time on
applications, which causes a diminution in the quality of the agency's decisions. See Schuck,
supra note 12, at 40; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ASYLUM ADJuDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 24 (1982). This system overload is likely to "ripple" through
other sections of the agency. If immigration judges, because of newly discovered ineligible
amnesty applicants, cannot conclude deportation hearings, the INS will find it difficult to
deport aliens.
It is also questionable whether the INS will be able to effectively administer the amnesty
program. Instead of taking this opportunity to "wipe the slate clean," the INS is taking a
very narrow view of its legislative mandate. See, e.g., Roberts & Yale-Loehr, Legislation
Aimed at Illegal Aliens: A High Stakes Riverboat Gamble, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27, 1987, at
16, 18. More importantly, it remains to be seen whether it has the resources to adjudicate
its potential caseload. At a recent meeting between immigration lawyers and INS officials of
the Washington, D.C., district office, the INS advised lawyers that they would be able to
adjudicate only 150 legalization applications per day. AMERICAN IMMORATION LAWYERS
Ass'N, MINUTES OF THE WAS-INS/AILA LIAISON MEETING 1 (1987). In this context, each
member of a family is considered to be a separate application.
67. The demand for legal migration under the quota system already far exceeds the availability
of immigrant visas. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS,
IMMIGRANT NUMBERS OF MARCH, 1987, at 2. In 1982, 700,000 persons in the fifth preference
category (brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens) could not receive visas because of quota
restrictions. See Simpson, Foreword: Immigration and Nationality Law Symposium, 20 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 1, 9 (1982). The immigrant visa backlogs have not improved, nor are they
expected to do so in the future. The "active" immigrant visa cases, those who have not
abandoned their applications, are as follows: 1983-1,411,151; 1984-1,587,360; 1985-
1,777,931; and 1986-1,903,475. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, WORLDWIDE VISA SERVICES DUING 1986, at 5 (Vol. 100, No. 5), reprinted in
INTERPRETER RELEASES 222, 238 (1987).
Because amnesty creates a two-tiered residency that does not allow newly documented
aliens to petition for family members until they have become permanent residents, the demand
and availability problems will be exacerbated when the amnestied aliens are eligible to petition
for their family members. This problem will place even more pressure on the already strained
quota system.
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used to have broad discretion in enforcement matters, now will have
to operate in the open, often clashing with such domestic interests as
agriculture and other industries. This will require the INS to exercise
great caution.
68
Immigration reform must be addressed boldly, not in a piecemeal
fashion. In order to be effective, reform must balance a number of
important factors. First, it must consider such national concerns as
foreign policy considerations and domestic economic and political issues.
Second, it must consider migrants' motivations, such as political and
economic problems, employment needs and family unification. Finally,
reform must consider humanitarian factors. Although these considera-
tions are difficult to balance, the 1986 Amendments have fallen woefully
short of reform. Instead of adopting a new approach, Congress built
upon a system motivated by a fear of outsiders.
The factors controlling migration and guiding policy have never
been constant. The world will always experience political or economic
problems. Perhaps the only predictable factor is that human migration
will always exist. Advancements in technology and communications,
coupled with the basic human desire to improve one's life, will increase
the number of migrants.
A PROPOSAL FOR TRUE REFORM
In light of these changing forces, an effective policy requires
flexibility. For instance, quotas must be eliminated. The same objectives
can be achieved by setting the annual limits using a consultative process
for family reunification immigration or expanding the use of blanket
labor certifications. Alternatively, the Executive and Congress could
periodically establish certain categories of aliens eligible for unlimited
migration. This system would allow immediate migration of qualified
persons and would eliminate the lengthy delays immigrants experience
under current law. This would remove one of the incentives behind
illegal migration. 6
9
The present quota system does not serve the national interest. For
example, most would agree that family reunification is a noble goal.
Yet, the quota system forces close family members of resident aliens
68. So far, the agency has proceeded with great caution. Breaking precedent, the agency
disseminated drafts of the implementing regulations instead of first publishing its Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. 4 FED. I OR. L. REP. (CCH), No. 59 at 1 (Jan. 20, 1987).
69. For example, under current law, aliens must first obtain approval of a petition submitted
on their behalf by a family member or prospective employer. Approval can take months.
Then, the application is forwarded to the U.S. Consul where aliens later file another
application for final approval of an immigrant visa. The scheduling of the final interview is
determined by the availability of visas under the quota system. See IA C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFEELD, supra note 12, at §§ 3.7-3.8. The wait can be for many years. See supra note
40 and accompanying text. For many, the wait overseas leads them illegally to the United
States, where they may wait for an available visa.
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and U.S. citizens to wait years for admission. Similarly, few would
argue that employers who have searched unsuccessfully for qualified
U.S. workers should have to wait years for qualified foreign workers.
These lengthy delays, common under existing law, would not occur
under a flexible system allowing immediate admission of qualified
aliens .
70
The 1986 Amendments create a two-tiered residency system. 71 Al-
though generous in granting amnesty, they create a permanent subclass
of aliens. Granting temporary status assures a degree of control over
aliens, yet the program's consequences could be negative, as evinced
by the problems experienced by western European nations with two-
tiered systems. 72 Temporary status requires aliens to eventually become
permanent residents and places upon them the burden of meeting the
requirements equivalent to establishing eligibility for U.S. citizenship.
In addition to the insecure status created by the two-tiered resi-
dency, the 1986 Amendments create a more complicated admission
procedure for aliens. The Amendments treat aliens differently depending
on whether they are agricultural workers, non-agricultural workers or
persons receiving immigration benefits through marriage. 73 It is ques-
tionable whether this disparate treatment of similarly situated aliens
satisfies the national objective of controlling the border.
When an employer establishes that hiring aliens will not adversely
affect the employment, wages or working conditions of U.S. workers,
aliens normally may enter the country subject to the availability of
visas under the quota system. 74 The labor certification procedure as it
exists is seriously flawed. First, the bureaucratic process can be time-
consuming. Second, the immigrant quota for alien beneficiaries is
exhausted notwithstanding the fact that U.S. workers will not be
adversely affected. Third, even though the 1986 Amendments create
special provisions for agricultural workers, some of these workers are
70. The serious delays common under the quota system have not been addressed and will be
exacerbated by the 1986 Amendments.
71. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
72. See Martin & Miller, Guestworkers: Lessons from Western Europe, 33 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REV. 315, 327 (1980); Plender, Recent Trends in National Immigration Control, 35 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 531, 547 (1986) (insecurity is inherent in a conditional status). For example,
because of severe restrictions on aliens within U.S. borders, it is more likely that alien
temporary employees will be subject to employer abuse. Temporary farm worker programs
present a situation in which there is little doubt alien workers are not taking work from
U.S. workers. If foreign agricultural workers significantly displaced U.S. workers, Congress
would not allow them to remain in the United States. Congress was concerned with making
sure amnestied agricultural workers stayed on the farm. See 132 CONG. REc. S16614 and
S16886 (daily eds. Oct. 16-17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson). Although it is not suggested
that every agricultural employer intends to abuse his employees, conditioning aliens' status
on continued employment will have significant negative consequences to relations.
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). For a general discussion of the labor certification process, see
Rubin & Mancini, supra note 45, at 77-80.
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considered "temporary" and are, thereby, precluded from receiving
permanent-resident benefits.
Congress could have restructured the labor certification process.75
It could have resolved the problem had it attacked the inflexible quota
system with, or in lieu of an amnesty program. 76 The motivations for
favoring agricultural interests should have been present for non-agri-
cultural employers, as well. 77 The benefits bestowed on agriculture,
although temporary, will highlight, by contrast, the effects that non-
agricultural employers will feel when the employer sanctions go into
effect.
7
The employee verification system will generate controversy. Merely
mentioning a national identification system raises the passions of civil
libertarians and conservatives. 79 Such a plan conjures up images of a
75. Congress redefined "temporary" as it applies to agricultural workers without addressing the
problems with immigrant quotas. The problem with the 1986 Amendments is not what they
try to do, but that they culminate in a mere temporary solution that appeases farm employer
interests. The pressure, as a result, will be temporarily eased. The United States has had
migrant workers for decades, and it is not likely that a temporary amnesty will resolve the
problem.
76. Unless it solves the fundamental immigration problems, amnesty can be a bureaucratic
nightmare with dubious returns. Given the large number of undocumented aliens and ineligible
applicants who must be processed, the system will be overloaded. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
77. Congress' favoring agricultural interests was motivated by the perception that there exists a
shortage of U.S. farm workers. See H. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-88 (1986).
Some examples of this favoritism can be seen in Section 116 of the 1986 Amendments, which
restricts warrantless searches of agricultural work places and the delay of sanctions for
agricultural workers until 1988. See PuB. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (adding
8 U.S.C. § 1324A(i)(3)(A)). Section 116 restricts the "open fields" doctrine endorsed by the
Court in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 116, 100 Stat.
3359, 3384 (1986). In a case decided the same day, the court held that a factory search
involving the questioning and arrest of employees did not amount to a seizure under the
fourth amendment. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984). The Court in Delgado found
no need to address the question of whether a warrantless search was permissible. Id. at 213.
Nevertheless, the difference in treatment between agricultural and non-agricultural employers
has been set out in the legislation.
Although there has been a steady erosion of aliens' rights in search and seizure questions,
it is notable that agricultural interests have been able to carve out an exception to the rule.
The Reagan Administration originally had opposed the differentiation in treatment between
farm and factory employers. See H. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1986). For a
more general discussion of the INS' authority to search businesses, see Note, Fourth
Amendment Warrant Standards for Immigration Search of Business Premises for Undocu-
mented Aliens: A New Hybrid Probable Cause, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 607 (1982); Comment, INS
Surveys of Business Establishments: Reasonable, Individualized Suspicion of Illegal Alienage,
78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 632 (1983).
78. Although agriculture will experience few disruptions, non-agricultural employers will quickly
experience the effects of sanctions, which could range from increased INS searches and
difficulty in filling certain jobs to higher labor costs.
79. The 1986 Amendments evince an attempt by Congress at balancing privacy and enforcement
interests. For example, the House Committee noted that the verification procedure was not
to be used for "administrative (non-criminal) enforcement purposes." See H. REP. No. 682,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, 68 (1986). Moreover, the verification system has yet to be created
and cannot be implemented without further Congressional approval. See generally Pub. L.
No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982)).
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national identification card. In addition to ideological objections, the
initial verification used by employers is highly susceptible to forgery.80
As do sanctions, however, a verification system only serves the national
interest if the family reunification and employment needs are satisfied.
Sanctions and verification attack a symptom, not a cause, and unless
the cause is addressed, the problem will not go away.
CONCLUSION
The success or failure of immigration reform does not lie in the
1986 Amendments. Rather, it lies in new legislative and executive
initiatives to alleviate pressures caused by issues unaddressed by the
1986 Amendments. Any effort further closing the border requires a
solution addressing the complex problem of human migration. The 99th
Congress only began to consider these forces. In order to obtain true
reform, we must address the basic inadequacies in the present system.
Until now we have been satisfied with avoiding immigration reform.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of the 1986 Amendments is that the new
law will highlight the fundamental deficiencies of our immigration law.
The hoped-for result will be a revitalization of efforts toward crafting
a positive immigration law and policy truly in our national interest.
Ultimately, failure to design a secure verification system could be the demise of the 1986
Amendments. Without verification, the employer sanctions will be unenforceable, and without
sanctions, there is no control of one of the important motivations for migration.
80. For example, an alien need only show his or her employer a Social Security card and driver's
license, both of which are widely available on the "black market." See Simpson, supra note
67, at 3-5.
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